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SECURITy-]'IRST NAT. BANK V. EARP.

[L. A. No. 17902. In Bank.

[19 C. (2d)

Mar. 5, 1942.]

SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK. OF LOS ANGELES (a National Banking Association), Appellant v.
ANNA L. EARP et aI., Respondents.
[1] Contracts-Rescission-Fraud-Misrepresentation of Instru-

ment: Reformation - Grounds - Misrepresent~tion of Instrument.-A person who has been induced to enter into a contract by fraudulent misrepresentations as to its contents may
rescind or reform the contract. His negligence in failing to
read the contract does not bar his right to relief if he was
justified in relying upon the representations. (Civ. Code,
§ 1689 (1).)
[2] Fraud-Actions-Defenses-Contributory Negligence. - Contributory negligence is no defense to an intentional wrong,
such as fraud consisting of misrepresentations as to the contents of an instrument.
[3] Cancellation-Actions-,-Evidence-Su:ffi.ciency-Misrepresentation of Instrument.-In an action to foreclose a trust deed
executed in renewal of a prior mortgage, where the defendants asked that the instrument be declared void by reason of
misrepresentation as t.o its contents, the evidence supported a
finding that the terms of the contract were fraudulently represented to the defendants and that they were justified in
relying upon the representation. Since they were already familiar with the terms of the old mortgage, they were justified
in assuming that there was no necessity for reading the instrument that was represented to them as a renewal of that
mortgage.
[4] Id.-Actions-Pleading-:rraud.-In an action to foreclose a
trust deed executed in renewal of a prior mortgage, the defendants .pleaded their right to rescission sufficiently when they
alleged a misrepresentation as to the contents of the instrument and requested that the trust deed be declared void.
[6] Id.-Conditions Precedent - Restitution - Where Party Re-

[1] See 12 Cal. Jur. 750.
[2] See 12 Cal. Jur. 758.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 206; Reformation of
Instruments, § 16; [2] Fraud and Deceit, § 49; [3] Cancellation
of Instruments, § 76; [4] Cancellation of Instruments, §56; [5]
Cancellation of Instruments, § 15.
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ceives Nothing of Value.-The defendants in an action to foreclose a trust deed who seck a rescission thereof by reason of
a misrepresentation that it was a renewal of a prior mortgage
are under no duty to mnko restitution where they received
nothing from the plaintiff under the rescinded provision that
they can restore.

APPEAL from a judgment of. the Superior Court of Los
Angeles Cuunty. Parker Wood, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to foreclose a trust deed.. J udgrrient for plaintiff
but refusing to declare that the deed was s~curity for one
indebtedness, affir.med..
Thorpe & Bridges and. Roane Thorpe for Appellant.
Vance Buoker and. P. N. Girard for Respondents.
'rRAYNOR, J.-Defendants, Mr. and. Mrs.D. M. Washburn, were indebted. to plaintiff, the Security First Nation::!J
Bank of Los Angeles, in the amount of $3,000. Thu debt was
secured by a mortgage un certain r~al property owned by
fendants. In 1933 defendants, together with certain other
persons, executed a joint and several promissory note for
$32,750, payable to plaiutiff with interest at seven per cent.
This noto was secured by a deed of trust on othtlr real property. In 1939 this trust deed was for0closed and the proeeeds
of the sale were applied to the debt, leaving an unpaid balance of $7,850.70.
In 1935 the $3000 mortgage, outstanding for about 10 years,
fell due. In response to a communication from plaintiff, Washburn went to the bank to arrange for a renewal. According to
Washburn's testimony he had the following conversation with
an employee of the bank: "He wanted to know if I could make
any payment at that time on the principal. I told him no, I
didn't see how I could, I said, 'Couldn't you extend it, this
mortgage for another year?' and he said, ' Well, no, I don't
know as we· can. Some payment should be made on the principal.' I said, 'Well, I am not able to do that right at this
time, but I know another bank, and also a building and loan
company, that might, that I would like to see, to see if they
would extend or would take this property for $3000 straight
loan, or lend $3000 straight loan on it.' And this man I was
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talking to then said,' Well, let me see a little bit further. '
And he went away from this desk and away from this counter,
and I don't know where he went, but he came back in a few
minutes-asked me to wait a few minutes-and said that if
I and Mrs. Washburn would come in tomorrow, that they
would extend this mortgage for another year, which we did,
and what I sic-ned the following day." Question: "You came
in the next day?" Answer: "Yes. And what I si::rned the
following day with Mrs. Washburn I assumed it wns the
extension of the mortgage for a year, which in so many words
I had been told it was."
Defendants thus signed a renewal note for $3,000 at 7 %
interest secured by what they bolieved to he the same mortgage extended for another year. Actually, however, the new
encumbrance was a trust deed and contained a provision, not
present in the previous mortgage, that it "Was g-iven to secure
the payment of all obligations, present and future, which were
then owing or might theroafter become owing from defendants .to plaintiff. This clause, couched in legal terminology,
was in a printed form in comparatively small print. Defendants, relying upon the representation of plaintiff's employee
that' they were signing a renewal of the old mortgage, did not
re~d the new encumbrance and were tllerefore unaware that
it was a trust deed containing the foregoing provisi()n.
Defendant defaulted in the payment of the $3,000 promissory nO'l~e, and plaintiff thereupon brought the present action,
asking that the trust deed be foreclosbd and the proceeds of
the sale' applied not only on the $3,000 obligation but also on
the $7,850.70 still owed by defendants .to plaintiff unrl.er the
$32,750 note. The trustee under the deed of trust and Anna
L. Earp, to whom the Washburns had subsequently conveyed
the property, were joined as defendants. Defendants in answer alleged that plaintiff, through one of its ag-ents, induced
them to sign the deed of trust by representing it to them as
an extension of the mortgage, and that in reliance upon this
representation they signed the instrument, unaware that it
was a deed of trust or that it purported to secure any indebtedness other than the $3,000 loan. They therefore asked that
the deed of trust be declared void.
. The trial court found that defendants did not intend to
execute a trust deed or to give the property as security for
any indebtedness other than the $3~0001 and that they signed
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the instrument without reading it in reliance upon the representation of plaintiff's employee. Judgment was entered
foreclosing the deed of trust given to secure· the $3,000 note.
Plaintiff was awarded a personal judgment against Washburn
for $7,850.70 with interest, but the court refused to decree
that this indebtedness was secured by the deed of trust. Plaintiff has appealed on the ground that defendants' failure to
read the instrument precludes them from setting up any misrepresentation of the contents as a defense.
[1] It is established in California and a majority of other
jurisdictions that a person who has been induced to enter
into a contract by fraudulent misrepresentations as to its contents may rescind or reform the contract. (Oalifornia Trust
00. v. Oohn, 214 Cal. 619 [7 Pac. (2d) 297]; Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 8 Cal. (2d) 660 [67 Pac. (2d) 339]; Wenzel v.
Schulz, 78 Cal. 221 [20 Pac. 404]; Johnson v. Sun Realty
00., 138 Cal. App. 296 [32 Pac. (2d) 393] ; Moore v. Oopp,
119 'Cal. 429 [51 Pac. 630]. See cases cited in 1 Page, Contracts (2d.ed.) secs. 229, 230, 233; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d.
ed.) sec. 2416. See Glickman v. New York Life Insurance 00.,
16 Oa1. (2d) 626 [107 Pac. (2d) 252, 131 A. L. R. 1292];
Seeger v. Odell, 18 Oal. (2d) 409 [115 Pac. (2d) 977]; Oal.
Oivil Oode, sec. 1689 (1).) His negligence in failing to read
the contract does not bar his right to relief (Oalifornia Trust
00. v. Oohn, supra; Fleury v. Ramacciotti, supra; Wenzel v.
Schulz, supra; Johnson v. Sun Realty 00., supra; Moore v.
Oopp, supra. See cases cited 1 Page, Oontracts (2d~ ed.) secs.
229, 230, 233; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. ed.) sec. 2416) if
he was justified in relying upon the representations. (See
Seeger v. Odell, supra; Rest., Torts, §537, and cases cited
in 12 Oal. Jur. 750 et seq.) [2] Contributory negligence
is no defense to an intentional wrong. (See Seeger v. Odell,
supra; Prosser, Torts, 748, 402, and cases cited in 12 CaL Jur.
758, 759.) In the cases of Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Cal. 555 [62
Pac. 1067] and Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748 [262 Pac. 322],
relied upon by plaintiff, there were no fraudulent representations as to the contents of the contracts in question. In each
case thedefendarit's misconception of the contract was attributable solely to his' failure to read it.
[3] In the present case there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial court that the terms of the contract were fraudulently represented to defendants and that
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they were justified in relying upon the representation. Defendants were not negotiating with plaintiff for the first time;
they had in fact dealt with plaintiff for a period of ten years.
Since they were already familiar with the terms of the old
mortgage, they were justified in assuming that there was no
necessity for reading the instrument that was represented to
them as a renewal of that mortgage.
[4, 5] In refusing to hold the trust deed as security for the
indebtedness of $7,850.70 the trial court in effect rescinded the
trust deed to that extent. Defendants pleaded their right to
rescission sufficiently when they alleged the misrepresentation
and requested that the trust deed be declared void. Since defendants received nothing from plaintiff under the rescinded provision that they can restore, they are under no duty to make
restitution. (See caS'es cited in 6 Cal. Jur. 387; 4 Cal. Jur. Tenyear Supp. 135.) Plai1;ltiff has already received compensation
for the extension of the indebtedness in the form of interest payments that continued until 1939, and plaintiff has a judgment
in its favor for the unpaid principal, interest, and expenses,
with a decree of foreclosure on the property for this amount.
The judgment is affirmed.

[2a, 2b] Compromise andSettlement-A\.,tions'-Damages_Mea_
sure.-Where a lessor is by fraud induced to compromise his
claims for rent part of which was reduced to jUdgment and the
balance admittedly due, the lessor electing to stand on the
contract and sue for dal:J.ages is not required to prove, and
the court is not required to find, that the claims· relinquished
were in fact collectible. Where· the claim forming the basis
of a compromise is fixed and certain, and where the plaintiff
under any theory is entitled to keep the amount paid, the
measure of damages, s" far as general damages are concerned, is prima facie the difference between the amount paid
on the compromise and the fixed and certain claim.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser,
J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[3] Fraud - Actions - Election of Remedies.-Where an advantageous contract is secured by fraud, the injured party may
elect to affirm the contract and sue. for the fraud.

[L. A. No. 17907.

In Bank.

Mar. 5, 1942.]

ROY CAMPBELL, as Trustee, etc., Respondent, v. A. OTIS
BIRCH· et al., Appellants.
[1] Fraud and Deceit - Actions - Evidence - Weight and Suffi.-

cbncy-Falsity.-In an action brought by a lessor and judgment creditor for fraud inducing a compromise of claims on
his judgment and for rent due and an agreement for reduction in rent, the evidence and inferences reasonably drawable
[lJ See 24 Cal. Jur. 886; 24 Am. Jur.118.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Fraud and Deceit, § 82; [2] Compromise and Settlement, § 14; [3J Frauu. and Deceit,§40; [4]
Appeal anJ Error, § 118; [5] Damages, § 49.

therefrom supported findings of (1) the existence of a conspiracy between defendants involving representations as to
indebtedness of the lessee and as to possible foreclosure sales
rendering him insolvent unless the plaintiff modified his claims,
(2) the falsity of the representations, (3) the purpose.
of inducing plaintiff to act upon the representations, and (4)
his reliance thereon in executing t1.e compromise and modification agreements, and this, although there was no evidence
that one defendant made any representation, and no direct
evidence that she knew what the other was doing.

[4] Appeal- Presenting and Reserving Objections _ Presenting
N"1w Defenses.-In an action for damages for fraud inducing
a compromise, a claim by the defendants that the court should
have considered a guaranty of rent as reduced by agreement
and the value of a canceled option to purchase may not be
urged for the first time on appeal.
[5] Damages-Attorneys' Fees-Litigation Arising out i)f Lease.Attorneys' fees are properly allowed in an action for fraud
predicated upon false statements of a lesseE' which induced the
lessor to compromise his claims, where the claims forming the
basis of th{· jl:dgment arp for the difference b~tween the reduced rentals and the amount called for in the' lease, and also
for tho difference due under the lease and the amount of
the compromise, and where the lease 1 :ovirled for payment by
the lessee of all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees in litigation "arising out of or in connection with this lease or the
construction or enforcement thereof."
[3] See 12 Cal. Jur. 781; 24 Am. Jur. 8•.

